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Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Do budget deﬁcits matter for the economy in general or real
interest rates in particular? About half the available empirical
studies say yes, and the other half say no. In this paper, we
explain how investigators examining the same body of data
canarriveatdiametricallyopposedconclusions.Weshowthat
these studies are ﬂawed by an important statistical problem
andthatthestudies’arbitraryresolutionofthisproblemcolors
their results. We also argue that this problem is difficult and
is not likely to be resolved soon.
The statistical problem is one of identiﬁcation. It involves
determining from reported time series the effects of changes
in deﬁcit policies on real economic variables. The problem
arises because changes in deﬁcits occur for a variety of rea-
sons, only one of which is changes in policy. Identiﬁcation re-
quires sorting out the policy contribution to deﬁcits.
The charton deﬁcitsand real interest ratessuggests the na-
ture of the identiﬁcation problem, since it seems to support
two very different conclusions. One might conclude from the
chart that deﬁcits and real interest rates are unrelated since for
certain years they appear positively correlated (early 1950s
and 1980s) and for others they appear negatively correlated.
On net, the correlation might be close to zero.
Theoppositeconclusionmightbereached,however,ifone
considers periods longer than years. One then might conclude
from the chart that deﬁcit policies are positively related to real
interest rates. In the 1960s and 1970s, one policy regime
seemed to be in place since little change occurred overall in
the debt-to-income ratio. Business cycle movements thus
couldhaveaccountedforthenegativecorrelationbetweenthe
plotted series over this period. Then in the 1980s, a change in
policy leading to a higher debt-to-income ratio could have
caused a higher real interest rate. What is clear is that the cor-
rect interpretation cannot be found by appealing to a graph or
to simple correlations. We need instead to examine the prob-
lem more deeply.
To do that we make use of an abstract structural model. It
is structural in the sense that it is intended to be behavioral;
it is abstract in the sense that the relationships are not ex-
plicitly derived from individual optimizing behavior. Never-
theless, we maintain that theory suggests aggregate relation-
shipswiththeargumentsweposit.Thismodelisusefulinthat
it subsumes other models used in the literature and allows us
to clearly state the identiﬁcation problem. It is intended to il-
lustrate the nature of the statistical problem without taking a
position on deﬁcit theories.
In order to clearly illustrate the identiﬁcation problem
within both its theoretical and empirical guises, we consider
a simple form of our abstract structural model. The simple
formcontainsjustbudgetdeﬁcitsandrealinterestrates.When
weestimateregressionequationsforthissimpleform,weﬁnd
that budget deﬁcits do not help explain real interest rates. But
wethenshowwhythisregressionresultisstillconsistentwith
a change in deﬁcit policies affecting real interest rates to an
arbitrary degree.
After illustrating the identiﬁcation problem, we survey
studies intheliterature whichhave attemptedto solveit.Even
though these studies represent only a small sample of the lit-
erature, they dorepresent the three main approaches research-
ers have taken.1With reference to our abstract structural mod-
el, we show why these studies have not satisfactorily resolved
the identiﬁcation problem.
Positing An Abstract Structural Model
We posit our model based on both statistical and theoretical
considerations. We discuss these considerations in turn.
Statistical Considerations
Although budget deﬁcits are often taken as shorthand for
policy, they respond to shocks from a variety of sources. The
change in an economic variable (such as a real interest rate)
which accompanies a change in the observed deﬁcit, can be
expected to depend on the source of change in the deﬁcit. A
model of budget deﬁcits needs to distinguish among at least
three sources of deﬁcit changes.
Budget deﬁcits can change when the state of the economy
changes. The degree of sensitivity is suggested by the Con-
gressional BudgetOffice’s (CBO’s)rules ofthumb, whiches-
timate how much the deﬁcit would change when the levels of
output, prices, or interest rates change—all else held equal.
(See CBO 1992.) A decline in output caused by a decline in
aggregate demand, for example, generally leads to a fall in
real interest rates. In this case, lower interest rates would be
accompanied by a rise in budget deﬁcits as income tax reve-
nues fall.2
The CBO’s rules of thumb suggest that the deﬁcit is quite
sensitive to changes in the real economy and interest rates but
not to changes in inﬂation. For instance, a one percentage
point decline in real growth beginning in January 1992 and
continuing indeﬁnitely is estimated to increase the ﬁscal 1994
budgetdeﬁcitby$48 billion.Similarly,aonepercentagepoint
increase in interest rates beginning in January 1992 is esti-
mated to increase the ﬁscal 1994 budget deﬁcit by $24 bil-
lion. However, a one percentage point decline in inﬂation is
expected to raise the 1994 budget deﬁcit by only $4 billion.
The deﬁcit is more sensitive to interest rate changes now than
it was in the past because the stock of public debt has roughly
quadrupled since 1980. The deﬁcit is much less sensitive to
inﬂation changes now than it was in the past because of the
indexing of income taxes and entitlements begun in 1982.
Budgetdeﬁcitscanalsochangeduetopolicyshocksunder
a given policy rule. A policy rule states how taxes and expen-
ditures are set based on current and past states of the econo-
my. But policymakers respond to information and events
which economists do not generally include as part of an eco-
nomic state. For instance, policymakers might increase mili-
taryspendingtemporarilytothwartaperceivedforeignthreat,
or they might allow passage of one-time tax breaks as induce-
ments to pass key legislation. One would expect the effect on
the real interest rate of such short-term, unpredictable actions
to be slight.
Finally, budgetdeﬁcits canchange whenthe budgetpolicy
rule changes. For example, over much of the postwar period,
thebudgettendedtobebalancedoverthebusinesscycle.This
rule seemed to change to one of permanent deﬁcits when the
Reagan administration took office. According to some theo-
ries, policyrule changesofthistype couldresult inhigherreal
interest rates.
Theoretical Considerations
This statistical distinction among sources of deﬁcit changes is
important because the theoretical issue about deﬁcit effects
concernsonlyeffectsfromchangesinpolicyrules,notshocks
or changes in the economy.3That is, different deﬁcits theories
make different predictions about the effects of rule changes.
More speciﬁcally, the two dynamic theories used to analyze
budget policy are the representative-agent, Ricardian model
(as in Barro 1974) and the overlapping-generation, non-
Ricardianmodel(asinWallace1984).Sinceboththeoriesare
dynamic, policy in themmust be considered asa function that
determines the values of policy variables at any given time
conditional on then available information. A rule such as this
is a solution to the government’s optimization problem, and
it is what individuals need to know to solve their expected
utility-maximization problems.
The two theories can imply differences in effects of deﬁcit
policies on real variables, such as real interest rates. One basic
difference concerns the neutrality of inﬂation. According toeither theory, seigniorage, or the inﬂation tax earned by cre-
ating money, is a potential source of revenue to the govern-
ment. Also, according to either theory, the budget must be
balanced in a present value sense when seigniorage is in-
cluded. Given a path of spending, the government can choose
amongalternativemixesoftheinﬂationtaxandexplicittaxes.
At issue is whether a change in this mix has real effects.
For Ricardian theories, changing the mixture of inﬂation
and explicit taxes, like changing the timedistribution of a giv-
endistortingtax,isassumedtohaveessentiallynorealeffects.
Barro (1989, p. 51) states that
The Ricardian approach to budget deﬁcits amounts to the
statement that the government’s ﬁscal impact is summa-
rized by the present value of its expenditures. Given this
present value, rearrangements of the timing of taxes—as
implied by budget deﬁcits—have no ﬁrst-order effect on
the economy. Second-order effects arise for various rea-
sons, which include the distorting effects of taxes....
For non-Ricardian theories, a change in the mix of inﬂa-
tion and explicit taxes is nonneutral. For example, Miller and
Wallace (1985) show that such a change corresponds to a dif-
ferent path of the government debt-to-output ratio. In non-
Ricardianmodels,achangeindeﬁcitﬁnancingpolicieswhich
results in a higher debt-to-output ratio can be associated with
a higher real interest rate.4
Whether deﬁcits matter, then, involves determining which
of these two theories is best supported by the data. More
speciﬁcally, the question is whether, and if so by how much,




tural model. Those considerations suggest that the policy rule
will take a form like
(1) Dt = α + β(L)Dt−1 + ξXt + δ(L)Xt−1 + θt
E(θt)=0 , θt ⊥ It−1 *
where Dt is a measure of the budget deﬁcit, Xt is a vector of
variables which represent the state of the economy, β and δ
are polynomials in the lag operator, with β(L)=β0 + β1L +
..., and δ(L)=δ0 + δ1L + ..., and the information set It−1 * ≡ Xt
∪ It−1, and It−1 ≡ {Dt−1,Xt−1,Dt−2,Xt−2,...}. Because the deﬁcit is
affected by the current state of the economy, we explicitly al-
low for this dependence with the argument Xt.5 This simple
rule allows for the three sources of budget deﬁcit changes we
established earlier: a change in the state of the economy (Xt,
Xt−1), a policy shock under a given rule (θt), and a change in
the policy rule (α, β, ξ,o rδ).
Our discussion of theory suggests the economic process
might take this form:
(2) Xt = ρ + σ(L)Dt−1 + τ(L
−1)Et−1Dt + ν(L)Xt−1 + ψt
Et−1(ψt)=Et−1(θtψt)=0 , ψt ⊥ It−1
where
τ(L
−1)Et−1Dt ≡τ 0Et−1Dt + τtEt−1Dt+1 + ...
+ τnEt−1Dt+n + ...
Et−1Dt+i ≡ E(Dt+i It−1).
In the economic process we include real variables, such as a
real interest rate. We imagine that the economic process ag-
gregates individual decision rules, giving rise to the Et−1Dt+i
terms from individuals’ dynamic optimization problems. We
also imagine that the economic process incorporates market-
clearing conditions. Based on Ricardian theories, the eco-
nomic process for real variables would thus be invariant to
any path of the deﬁcit which, together with seigniorage, sat-
isﬁes present-value balance. This follows because such the-
ories hold that markets will clear with the same real quantities
and prices but with changes in private saving offsetting any
changes in deﬁcits. According to Ricardian theory, since the
invariance must hold for any path of deﬁcits and seigniorage
satisfying present-value balance, the τ coefficients associated
with real variables Xmust be zero. Non-Ricardian theories, in
contrast, do not imply invariance to changes in the path of the
deﬁcit and thus do not imply τ is zero. Based on some non-
Ricardian theories, for example, it follows that for the τ
i’s as-
sociated with the real interest rate X
i, Σnτn
i > 0, since an addi-




pectations terms Et−1Dt+i.We can, however, estimate a plausi-
ble reduced form for (Dt,Xt), which is just the unrestricted
vector autoregression (VAR) system7
(3) Dt = a + b(L)Dt−1 + c(L)Xt−1 + ut
(4) Xt = d + e(L)Dt−1 + f(L)Xt−1 + vt
where ut and vt are white noise error terms.
In order to determine the effects of a change in deﬁcit pol-
icy—achangeinthecoefficientsofequation(1)—ontheeco-
nomic process in (2), we must be able to identify the coeffi-
cients in (1)–(2) from the estimated coefficients in (3)–(4).
Thatwouldenableustoanswerquestionssuchas,Doesaper-
manent increase in the deﬁcit (∆α > 0) increase the real
interest rate (dX
i/dα > 0)?
It is clear, though, that the coefficients of (1)–(2) cannot in
general be identiﬁed from the estimated coefficients of (3)–
(4). There are more coefficients in (1)–(2) than there are
restrictions in (3)–(4). For arbitrary values of τ, values can be
found for the other coefficients of (2), so that the model
(1)–(2) generates the model (3)–(4).
We can clearly illustrate the nature of the identiﬁcation
problem and show how it arises in practice by taking the spe-
cial case where all lag polynomials and X are expressed in
termsofrealvariablesinsteadofvectors.Supposetheabstract
structural model has the special form
(5) Dt = α + βDt−1 + ξXt + δXt−1 + θt
(6) Xt = ρ + σDt−1 + τEt−1Dt + νXt−1 + ψt
with
Etθt = Etψt = Et(θtψt)=0 .
Assuming ξτ≠1, the model (5)–(6) can be put in estimable
form to yield
(7) Dt =( α+ξρ)/(1−ξτ)+( β+ξσ)/(1−ξτ) Dt−1
+( δ+ξν)/(1−ξτ) Xt−1 +[ θt+ξψt]
(8) Xt =( ρ+ατ)/(1−ξτ)+( σ+βτ)/(1−ξτ) Dt−1
+( ν+δτ)/(1−ξτ) Xt−1 + ψt.
Regressions provide the estimated coefficients and residuals
to the equations
(9) Dt = a ˆ + b ˆDt−1 + c ˆX t−1 + u ˆt(10) Xt = d ˆ + e ˆDt−1 + f ˆXt−1 + v ˆt.
Although the system (9)–(10) provides nine restrictions,
the underlying system (5)–(6) has 10 unknown coefficients
(countingerrorvariances),suggestingthesystemisnotidenti-
ﬁed. Since (5) is already a regression equation, its coefficients
can be identiﬁed from (9)–(10).8 Thus the coefficients of the
economic process (6) are the ones not identiﬁed. The identiﬁ-
cation of the coefficients of (5) is given simply by
(11) ξ ˆ =
tu ˆtv ˆt tv ˆt
2
α ˆ=a ˆ − ξ ˆd ˆ
β ˆ = b ˆ − ξ ˆe ˆ
and
δ ˆ = c ˆ − ξ ˆ f ˆ.
Given these values, (8) and (10) provide three equations in
the four unknown coefficients of the economic process, ρ, σ,
τ, and ν:
(12) ρ = d ˆ −( α ˆ+ξ ˆd ˆ)τ
σ = e ˆ −( β ˆ+ξ ˆe ˆ)τ
and
ν = f ˆ −( δ ˆ+ξ ˆ f ˆ)τ.
For any arbitrary value of τ (as long as ξ ˆτ≠1), these three
equations can be solved for ρ,σ, and ν. [This same argument
about underidentiﬁcation goes through for any ﬁnite order lag
lengths for the polynomials in (1)–(2).] Estimating (9) and
(10) then cannot pin down the values of σ and τ, which must
be done to determine whether deﬁcit policies matter.
Estimating Our Model
We now apply our simple model to the data to show how this
problem comes up in practice. We estimate equations (9) and
(10) using annual U.S. data over the period 1949–87. We take
D to be the growth in outside federal debt less the growth in
nominal gross national product (GNP), and we take X to be
the annual average of quarterly ex-post real Treasury bill
rates.9 Recall that plots of the two series were shown on the
chart presented earlier. (See the Appendix for a discussion of
our choice of variables.)
We estimate (9) and (10) using ordinary least squares.
Standard tests of lag lengths in VARs indicate that a one lag
speciﬁcation is appropriate for this system. Estimated coeffi-
cients and summary statistics are shown in the table.
Our estimated model seems to share some properties with
other models that purport to show deﬁcits do not matter. The
coefficientonourdeﬁcitmeasureintherealinterestrateequa-
tion is not signiﬁcant at standard levels of conﬁdence. The F-
tests indicate that deﬁcits do not help in predicting real inter-
est rates. In fact, the real interest rate appears to be well ap-
proximated as a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.
Appearances can be deceptive, however. This estimated
modelisactuallyconsistentwithdeﬁcitsmatteringaswehave
deﬁned them. The change in the real interest rate in response
to a change in the intercept of the policy rule αis given in (8)
by dXt/dα = τ/(1−ξ ˆτ).
Since any value of τ is consistent with our estimated coef-
ﬁcients, we can ask for what values will dXt/dα be signiﬁ-
cantly positive—say, dXt/dα > 0.5. We use our model’s esti-
mate of ˆ ξ of 0.71 and solve for τ from the inequality
(13) (dXt/dα)=τ/(1−0.71τ) > 0.5 ↔ 0.37 < τ < 1.41.
For these values of τ, then, it follows that a change in αwhich
initially raises the growth of debt relative to GNP by one per-
centage point will raise the real interest rate by at least one-
half of a percentage point. For these values of τ, one could
ﬁnd that past deﬁcits do not help in predicting the real interest
rate; yet a change in deﬁcit policy which leads to a perma-
nentlyhigherdebt-to-incomeratiowouldraisetherealinterest
rate signiﬁcantly. In fact as τ gets close to 1.41, the effect of
higher deﬁcits on the real interest rate becomes arbitrarily
large.
Three Approaches That Fail
Studiesintheliteraturehavetakenthreeapproachestoquanti-
fy the effects of budget policy changes. In this section, we de-
scribe these approaches in the context of our abstract structur-
al model and then suggest why these previous studies have
not been successful.
Estimating Effects Directly...
One approach is to directly estimate the effects of policy
changes as in Miller 1983 and Miller and Roberds 1987.
These studies propose dates of policy rule changes, judge
whether policy actually changed, and then examine the esti-
mated economic process before and after the potential breaks
to check for structural change. The logic is that if the policy
rule changes and individuals incorporate the new rule in their
expectations, estimated coefficients of a linear econometric
process can change. More speciﬁcally, in a model such as
(1)–(2), a change in α, β, ξ,o rδ will lead to a change in the
estimated coefficients of (4).10
This approach is related to Marschak’s (1953) method for
identifying policy effects. Marschak points out that if enough
observationsonpolicychangesexist,onecansimplyestimate
the relationship between the coefficients in (4) and the pa-
rameters of (1). From this perspective, the shortcoming of the
Miller 1983 and the Miller and Roberds 1987 approach is too
few observations to be sure the effects of policy have been
identiﬁed. This point is illustrated in the following example.11
Suppose there are observations on n policy changes at pe-
riods ti = t0 + i∆t,i= 0, ..., n − 1, consisting of a change in
α, where αti = α0 + i∆α, i = 0, ..., n − 1. We could estimate
(4) over each subperiod (ti,ti+1) and get n estimates of d, e,
and f. The estimated change in the coefficients from one pe-
riod to the next will in general be different, however, because
the θ’s and ψ’s will be different in each subperiod. With
enough observations, the mean of the change in coefficients
will go to the true change. With only one policy change, as in
Miller 1983 or Miller and Roberds 1987, essentially only one
observation is available to estimate the change in coefficients.
Thus we have too few observations to determine whether the
change in estimated coefficients is due to a change in α or to
different draws of θ and ψ in each subperiod.
. . . Restricting Coefficients to Zero...
A second approach to identifying budget policy effects is to
attempt to identify the coefficients of the abstract structural
model using restrictions not derived from individual optimiz-
ing behavior. That is, if τ in (2) can be identiﬁed, the effects
of a change in budget policy can be determined from (4), as
in (8). Since τ cannot be identiﬁed from (3) and (4) without
some restrictions, the values of τ found in the literature are as
arbitrary as the imposed restrictions.12 Arbitrary restrictions
cannotsolvethisidentiﬁcationproblem,althoughmoststudies
in the literature follow this approach.
Dwyer (1982), Evans (1987b), Kormendi (1983), and
Plosser (1982) estimate a version of (4) and test whether the
coefficientse ˆ(L)aresigniﬁcant.Ineffect,theseresearchersar-
bitrarily restrict coefficients in (2) to zero. As can be seen in
(8), knowing e ˆ = 0 by itself only implies that σ and τ are ona particular line. So these studies can be interpreted in one of
two ways: either they assume σ = 0 and take e ˆ = 0 to imply
τ = 0, or they assume τ = 0 and take e ˆ = 0 to imply σ =0 .
Either assumption is arbitrary and fails to resolve the identiﬁ-
cation problem.13
Ideally, a test would allow discrimination between Ricar-
dian and non-Ricardian theories. For non-Ricardian theories
there is no reason to believe either σ or τ is zero. Restricting
either one to zero biases the test results in favor of Ricardian
theories. In our estimated model, for example, we found e ˆ to
be insigniﬁcantly different from zero, but our ﬁnding was
shown to be consistent with a structural model in which deﬁ-
cit policies matter signiﬁcantly.
Some studies using this second method try to estimate τ
directly by using various measures of predicted deﬁcits, the
Et−1Dt+i. If the measures are derived within the model, they
are constructed with the aid of incredible identifying assump-
tions. If the measures are derived outside the model, they are
inconsistent with the model’s predictions. Either method is
unsatisfactory.
SeveralresearchersattempttoconstructaseriesforEt−1Dt+i
using the predictions of their models. Evans (1987a) assumes
that deﬁcits are an exogenous process and tests whether past
or future deﬁcits signiﬁcantly affect interest rates. In terms of
our model, Evans (1987a) constructs Et−1Dt by assuming ξ =
δ = 0. In the (5)–(6) version of the model, this assumption
leads to the estimation equations
(14) Dt = a + bDt−1 + ut
(15) Xt = d + eDt−1 + fX t−1 + g(a ˆ+b ˆDt−1)+ut
where a ˆ and b ˆ are ordinary least squares estimates of a and
b.
Two criticisms can be made of Evans’ approach. First, the
assumption that deﬁcits are exogenous (ξ = δ = 0) is not rea-
sonable. The CBO’s rules of thumb suggest they are not ex-
ogenous. Our simple annual model implies values of ξ ˆ = 0.71
and δ ˆ = 1.40. An F-test of the null hypothesis H0, that ξ =0
and δ = 0, rejects exogeneity at the 1 percent level. In larger
systems that include other macroeconomic variables, exoge-
neity of deﬁcits is also easily rejected.14 Hence we regard the
assumption of exogeneity as unrealistic. Second, given the
assumption that deﬁcits are exogenous, only sums of coeffi-
cients on Dcan be estimated, such as e+b ˆg. The coefficients
e and g cannot be estimated separately, and knowing their
weighted sum indicates nothing about their individual values.
Thomas and Abderrezak (1988) use their model to gener-
ate values for Et−1Dt+i under the assumption that σ = 0. The
estimate of e together with estimates for β and ξ will then
provide an estimate of τ: τ ˆ=e ˆ/(β ˆ+e ˆξ ˆ). [See (8).] There is no
reason to believe, however, that σ =0 .
Plosser (1987) uses two estimated equations such as
(9)–(10) to generate Et−1Dt+i and then tests whether the coeffi-
cient g is signiﬁcant in the augmented equation (10):
(16) Xt + d + eDt−1 + fX t−1 + gEt−1Dt + vt.
But the calculated series Et−1Dt is a linear function of Dt−1 and
Xt−1. So by construction, adding Et−1Dt cannot improve the ﬁt
of the equation.
Some others who use this second approach take Et−1Dt+i
from outside the model (for example, Evans 1987a, Feldstein
1986,andPlosser1987).TheirmeasuresforEt−1Dt+iimplicitly
incorporate a path for EtXt+i since predictions of deﬁcits gen-
erally depend upon an assumed path for the economy. If the
Et−1Dt+i,E t−1Xt+i paths from outside the model match those
generated by the model, then those paths are spanned by past
D and X, and individual coefficients on past and future Ds
cannot be identiﬁed as was the case when these paths were
generated from within the models. However, in general the
paths generated from within the model will be different from
those assumed from outside the model. This difference im-
plies an inconsistency: either the model is misspeciﬁed, or the
values assumed for Et−1Dt+i and Et−1Xt+i are not individuals’
expectations.15
. . . And Estimating Deep Parameters
Using structural methods is a third approach some studies in
the literature take to identify policy effects. The idea is to
specifyageneralequilibriummodelandestimatedeepparam-
eters of utility functions. Then the estimated model will deter-
mine whether σ and τ are signiﬁcantly different from zero.
(See, for example, Aschauer 1985.)
The problem with this approach is that the result is largely
determinedbyassumptionsaboutinteractionsamongindivid-
ual agents in the model. For example, if the model assumes
all individuals are linked to one another through bequests,
then it follows that the model’s population can be thought of
as a single, inﬁnitely lived, representative agent, and Ricar-
dian equivalence will hold. If instead individuals are not
linked through bequests, then deﬁcits that imply shifts in tax
burdens across generations will matter. The result depends on
how individuals are linked, and that, in turn, depends on more
than just the deep parameters of individual utility functions.
Thus we need a grand model in which the linkages among
agents can be parameterized and estimated. So far, no one has
done that satisfactorily. Using the simplest of settings, Abel
and Bernheim (1991) show theoretically how this approach
could be followed. Their models are much too simple, how-
ever, to attempt to match them to data.
Evans (1991) considers general equilibrium models in
which a parameter measures how closely individuals are
linked. He shows that for reasonable values of these parame-
tersRicardianequivalenceisagoodapproximation.Whilehis
approach is reasonable, his grand models are not broad
enough to span the alternative formulations. Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) and Miller and Todd (1991), for example,
are able to match to Evans’ data nonbequest general equilibri-
um models for which Ricardian equivalence is a bad approxi-
mation.
Concluding Remarks
Deﬁcit policies may matter, and then again they may not.
Existing studies really don’t tell us much about their effects
because these studies are ﬂawed by the identiﬁcation problem
we have examined here.
Perhaps the most promising approach to alleviate this
problem is that taken by Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) and
Abel and Bernheim (1991). They show, within given models,
underwhatconditionsRicardianequivalenceholds.Theythen
derive in these models other testable implications that follow
from those conditions. If the implications are rejected, Ricar-
dian equivalence is also rejected for these models.
The task for future researchers is to construct models of
this type that can be matched to the data. Until then, we will
have to be content just to clearly understand how little we
really know about deﬁcit policy effects.
The Editorial Board for this paper was Michael P. Keane, Kathleen S.
Rolfe, Arthur J. Rolnick, and Richard M. Todd.
1Foranextensivesurveyoftheempiricaleffectsofbudgetdeﬁcitsoninterestrates,
seeCongressional BudgetOffice (CBO)1987, chap.III. Notsurprisingly,reported esti-
mates vary widely.
2The relationship of interest rates and deﬁcits when the path of output changes
might also depend on the source of output change. A preference shock might suggest
one relationship, while a technology shock might suggest another.
3Lucas(1976)makesaconvincingargumentthatpolicyevaluationcanonlybecar-
ried out with respect to rules.4Inthesenon-Ricardianmodels,ahighergovernmentdebt-to-outputratioisassoci-
ated with a lowercapital-to-output ratio. If theproduction technology is strictlyconvex,
thelatterimplies ahigher realinterestrate (forexample, Miller1983).Other non-Ricar-
dianmodelsexist,however,inwhichpoliciesarenonneutral,butinwhichtherealinter-
est rate in equilibrium is totally determined by technology or by individuals’ constant
rate of time preference. Because nonneutral policy changes need not affect the real in-
terest rate, a ﬁnding of no relationship between the real interest rate and budget deﬁcit
policies does not lead to rejection of non-Ricardian theories. However, a ﬁnding of a
relationship does leadto rejection of Ricardian theories.Our point in this paper,though,
is not to argue whether that relationship is there or not; it is to argue that no one has de-
termined what that relationship is.
5Our formulation assumes that all contemporaneous causality runs from X to D.
This assumption is both plausible and convenient for our purposes, since it reduces the
number of parameters in equations (1)–(2) by one. The ensuing analysis, however, is
robust to relaxation of this assumption.
6We can imagine models for which X is the real interest rate and τi =
τ/Πj
i
=1(1+Xt+j−1), with X0 = 0. In the next section we show that even with a single ex-
pectations coefficient τ, the model is not identiﬁed as long as the degree of σ is
arbitrary.
7Conditionsunderwhichthemodel(1)–(2)hasauniquereducedformcorrespond-
ing to (3)–(4) can be derived from Watson 1989. Since these conditions are algebraical-
ly complicated for the general case and are not intuitively meaningful, we will assume
that such conditions hold without explicitly stating them.
8Since the coefficients of (5) can be identiﬁed, the CBO’s rules of thumb provide
no additional restrictions to help identify our system.
9Ricardianequivalenceholdsthepathofgovernmentspendingconstantandallows
the path of tax revenues to change. In our bivariate system, we cannot distinguish
between spending and revenue changes. For our empirical results to be relevant for
Ricardian equivalence, we must assume that spending is being held constant.
Wealsoconstructedatrivariatemodelwhichaddsfederalexpendituresnet-of-inter-
est. [See discussion following (14) and (15) above.] Although that model allows us to
distinguish more precisely between Ricardian and non-Ricardian theories, it is more
complicated and in no way alters the identiﬁcation problem which is the focus of this
paper.
10In the case of the estimated model (9) and (10), standard tests of stability suggest
that both equations changed during the 1980s. As discussed below, such results do not
necessarily prove that there was a shift in policy during the 1980s, nor do they prove
that higher real rates were caused by such a shift.
11This example essentially describes the method used in Poterba and Summers
1987. That study also suffers from too few observations.
12Similar arguments were made more generally, or in other contexts, in Sargent
1976 and Sims 1980. We make the argument again since it seems to receive so little
attention in the many articles published in the empirical deﬁcit policy literature. A not-
able exception is Bernheim’s 1989 article, which surveys the literature.
13Dwyer (1982, p. 327) recognizes this limitation in stating that some of his analy-
sis is “... more tentative because it is based on the adequacy of the structural model
which implies the results of the reduced-form tests in this paper.”
14See, for example, Dwyer 1982. We also rejected the exogeneity of deﬁcits in our
trivariate system. (See fn 9.)
15It could be, for instance, that Et−1Dt+i incorporates announced changes about
policy, such as a change in α, β, ξ,o rδ. However, (9) and (10) (augmented or not)
assume no change in policy.
Appendix
Choosing Our Regression Model Variables
This Appendix explains the choice of regression model variables in
the preceding paper. Although our choice of deﬁcit measure is moti-
vated by our theoretical discussion, it is somewhat limited by the
constraints of a bivariate system. Not only is our measure affected
by budget policy, it also changes due to inﬂation surprises and to
forces that alter the economy’s real interest rate or real growth rate.
Someofthoseforcesincludechangesintastes,technologicalshocks,
or perhaps changes in monetary policy.
We can simply illustrate the relationship between budget policy
and our measure using the derivation
(A1) Dt =( πt
e−πt)+( Xt−gt)+( DEFt/Bt−1)
where D is our measure of budget policy:
Dt ≡ (Bt/Bt−1)−( Yt/Yt−1),
in which
B = end-of-period outside government debt
Y = nominal GNP
and where
π
e = expected inﬂation
π = actual inﬂation
X = the one-period real interest rate
g = the growth rate of real GNP
DEF = the government deﬁcit net-of-interest.
We derive the relationship using simple algebra. We have by
deﬁnition Bt = (1+rt)Bt−1 + DEFt, where B is debt, DEF is the net-
of-interest deﬁcit, and r is the nominal one-period interest rate.
Relative to nominal income Yt, we have
(A2) (Bt/Yt) = (1+rt)(Bt−1/Yt−1)(Yt−1/Yt)+( DEFt/Yt)
so that
(Bt/Yt)−( Bt−1/Yt−1)
= (1+rt)(Yt−1/Yt)−1( Bt−1/Yt−1)+( DEFt/Yt).
Our measure Dt is given by
(A3) Dt =( Bt/Bt−1)−( Yt/Yt−1)=( Yt/Bt−1)( Bt/Yt)−( Bt−1/Yt−1)
= (1+rt)(Yt−1/Yt)−1( Yt/Yt−1)+( DEFt/Bt−1).
Let
(A4) (Yt/Yt−1)=1+gt + πt
where g is the real growth rate and π is the inﬂation rate, and let
(A5) rt = Xt + πt
e
where X is the real interest rate and π
e is the expected inﬂation rate.
We then have
(A6) Dt = (1+Xt+πt
e) − (1+gt+πt)+( DEFt/Bt−1)
=( πt
e−πt)+( Xt−gt)+( DEFt/Bt−1).
We chose Dt rather than DEFt/Bt−1 as our policy measure for
two reasons:
• Even though the latter is a purer measure of budget policy,
non-Ricardian theories such as Miller and Wallace 1985 sug-
gest that the real interest rate is affected by changes in the mix
of monetary and budget policies that lead to changes in the
government debt-to-output ratio. Thus changes in DEFt/Bt−1
would be expected to have no effect on the real interest rate
if they were accommodated by monetary policy and resulted
in no change to Dt.
• The basic issue separating Ricardian and non-Ricardian
theories seems to be whether a change in the government
debt-to-output ratio is perfectly offset by a change in the
opposite direction in the private debt-to-output ratio. For
Ricardian theories it is perfectly offset, so the real interest rate
should not be sensitive to our policy measure. For non-
Ricardian theories it is not perfectly offset, so the real interest
rate should be sensitive to our measure.
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